PROCESSO SELETIVO 2016-2017

PROVA DE LÍNGUA ESTRANGEIRA – INGLÊS

2 de Dezembro de 2016

Instruções:

1. Na página seguinte, você encontrará quatro questões, que devem ser respondidas tendo como base o texto em inglês que acompanha a prova.

2. As questões deverão ser respondidas em um **arquivo Word** no qual deve constar, na primeira linha, seu nome completo. Todas as questões são obrigatórias.

3. Só é permitido o uso de **dicionários** trazidos pelos próprios candidatos. Não será aceito nenhum outro material de consulta.

4. Você terá **quatro horas** para concluir a prova, que deve ser respondida **em português**.

5. Cada resposta deverá ser identificada com o **número da questão**.

6. Procure ater-se ao texto para elaborar suas respostas.

7. Ao responder as questões, **não forneça uma tradução do texto original**. Lembre-se que o objetivo desta prova é avaliar sua capacidade de leitura e compreensão de textos em língua estrangeira.

8. Ao concluir a prova, certifique-se de que a identificou com seu nome e peça ao responsável pela aplicação do exame que **salve seu arquivo pdf em um *pendrive***.

Texto-base: SAHLINS, Marshall. 2013. "Mutuality of being". In *What Kinship Is – And Is Not* [excertos]. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. pp. 19-23.

Questões

1) Comente, com base no texto, a afirmação dada por um Canaque a Maurice Leenhardt de que os missionários não teriam levado até eles a noção de alma, mas a de corpo.

2) Qual é a definição de "sistema de parentesco" dada pelo autor?

3) Segundo o autor, qual é a relação entre seu conceito de "mutualidade do ser" e a obra de Aristóteles?

4) Com base no texto, dê dois exemplos etnográficos do que o autor chama de "mutualidade do ser".

Mutuality of Being

In his capacity as a missionary, Maurice Leenhardt once suggested to a New Caledonian elder that Christianity had introduced the notion of spirit (*esprit*) into Canaque thought. "Spirit? Bah!" the old man objected: "You didn't bring us the spirit. We already knew the spirit existed. We have always acted in accord with the spirit. What you've brought us is the body" (1979, 164). Commenting on this interchange, Roger Bastide wrote, "The Melanesian did not conceive himself otherwise than a node of participations; he was outside more than he was inside himself" (1973, 33). That is, Bastide explained, the man was in his lineage and his totem, in nature and in the *socius*. By contrast, the missionaries would teach him to sunder himself from these alterities in order to discover his true identity, an identity marked by the limits of his body.

Later in the same essay, Bastide transposed this Melanesian sense of personhood to the African subjects he was principally concerned with, and in so doing produced a clear description of the "dividual person," the one destined for anthropological fame from the writings of McKim Marriott (1976) and Marilyn Strathern (1988). Bastide wrote of the person "who is divisible" and also "not distinct" in the sense that aspects of the self are variously distributed among others, as are others in oneself. Emphasizing these transcendent dimensions of the individual, he noted that "the plurality of the constituent elements of the person" moved him to "participate in other realities." Reincarnating

9. Thanks to Rob Brightman for this etymological comment on totemism.

an ancestor, he had a portion of the lineage within him; associated with a totem, he had an "exterior soul" as well as an internal one; knowing a bush-dwelling twin, he overcomes the distance that separates him from sacred space. Hence for the African as for the Melanesian, "he does not exist except in the measure he is 'outside' and 'different' than himself" (Bastide 1973, 38).[10]

This, then, is what I take a "kinship system" to be: a manifold of intersubjective participations, which is also to say, a network of mutualities of being. The present discussion thus joins a tradition that stretches back from Strathern, Marriott, and Bastide; through Leenhardt, Lévy-Bruhl, and Durkheim; to certain passages of Aristotle on the distinctive friendship of kinship. The classical text is the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Anchored as it may be in concepts of birth and descent, Aristotle's discussion of kinship at once goes beyond and encompasses relations of procreation in larger meanings of mutual belonging that could just as well accommodate the various performative modes of relatedness. Or so I read the possibilities of his sense of kinship as "the same entity in discrete subjects":

> Parents love children as being themselves (for those sprung from them are as it were other selves of theirs, resulting from the separation), children [love] parents as being what they have grown from, and brothers [love] each other by virtue of their having grown from the same sources: for the selfsameness of their relation to *those* produces the same with each other (hence the way people say "same blood," "same root," and things like that). They are, then, the same entity in a way, even though in discrete subjects. . . . The belonging

10. Among other early ethnographic notices of "dividuals," there is Nancy Munn on Gawan funeral custom:

> Gawan mortuary practices are concerned with factoring out the marital, paternal and maternal components which have been amalgamated to form the deceased's holistic being, and with returning this being to a partial, detotalized state—its unamalgamated matrilineal source. Death itself . . . dissolves neither the intersubjective amalgam that constitutes the *bodily person* and forms the ground of each self, nor the intersubjective connections between others built on and condensed within the deceased's person. (1986, 164; my emphasis)

to each other of cousins and other relatives derives from these, since it exists by virtue of their being of the same origins, but some of these belong more closely while others are more distant, depending on whether the ancestral common sources are near or further off. (Aristotle 2002, VIII.1161ᵃ–1162ᵇ; emphasis in original)

Of course, as the sage says, such intersubjectivity comes in various forms and degrees. But generally considered, kinsmen are persons who belong to one another, who are parts of one another, who are co-present in each other, whose lives are joined and interdependent. Ethnography tells repeatedly of such co-presence of kinsmen and the corollaries thereof in the transpersonal unities of bodies, feelings, and experience. Before exploring the relevant notion of being and its entailments, however, it is useful to consider a few examples.

Such as the ancient comment on kinship from the eastern side of the Indo-European world that effectively rehearses the kinship unities of common descent discussed by Aristotle: "The notion of basic similarity between those engendered by the same male is beautifully underlined in the *Panduan*, a localised Himalayan version of the *Mahabharata* when Arjuna referring to Bhima says, 'I am his brother, his cousin, his offspring, as also his ancestor'" (Böck and Rao 2000, 7).

In *The Maori and His Religion* (a yet-to-be-acknowledged classic of kinship studies), J. Prytz Johansen writes: "Kinship is more than what to us is community and solidarity. The common will which conditions the solidarity is rooted in something deeper, an inner solidarity of souls" (1954, 34). Johansen cites an old text collected by John White: "'You were born in me,' says a Maori. 'Yes that is true,' admits the other, 'I was born in you.'" The interchange of being is more complex here than it appears, Johansen notes, if due to the same sense of transpersonal existence, for the Maori pronoun "I" is also used to refer to one's entire kinship group (*hapuu*, usually), past or present, collectively or in regard to famous members. More on this "kinship I" in a moment, but in the present connection recall the distinctive

possessive pronouns in Polynesian languages that notably refer to certain relatives and parts of one's body, and signify an inalienable and intrinsic attachment. A similarly telling semantics of common being is conveyed by the pronouns affixed to kinship terms in New Caledonia, thereby making the possessed person appear "an integral part of the possessor" (Leenhardt 1979, 13).

Something similar is also involved in the difference reported for English townspeople by Jeanette Edwards and Marilyn Strathern between relating to others and "being related." As they write, "The belonging produced by kinship has, for these people, a whole further dimension to it" (2000, 153). Persons in Alltown may have a sense of common belonging through what belongs to them, but "families consider themselves as people who belong to one another" (150). Janet Carsten develops a similar conclusion from contemporary accounts of adopted persons who search for their birth kin. Without knowledge of their birth mother, though to a lesser extent the father, these people, Carsten comments, apparently experience a sense of self as "fractured and partial." Here, then, is a notion of personhood where kinship is not simply added to bounded individuality, but where "relatives are perceived as intrinsic to the self" (2004, 106–7).

Just as English families are "people who belong to one another," so for the Nyakyusa of the African Rift Valley, kinsmen are "members of one another" (Wilson 1957, 226). Monica Wilson puts the phrase in quotation marks, although it is unclear whether she is citing Nyakyusa rather than St. Paul on the relations between members of the body of Christ. Like the constructivism of the latter, however, Nyakyusa conceive a kinship of mutual being with co-residents of their age-villages as well as consanguines and those to whom cattle have been given, that is, affines (Wilson 1950, 1951). Inversely if to similar effect, Victor Turner relates of the Ndembu that people live together because they are matrilineally related, for "the dogma of kinship asserts that matrilineal kin participate in one another's existence" (1957, 129). All this gives sense to Wilson's useful characterization of kinship terms as "categories of belonging," a phrase also adopted

by Bodenhorn in regard to Iñupiat (2000, 131). Kin terms indicate kinds and/or degrees of conjoint being: their reciprocals thus complete a relationship that amounts to a unity of differentiated parts (see below). Brothers and sisters, say Karembola people of Madagascar, are "one people"; they are "people of one kind"; they "own one another" (Middleton 2000, 113).

Defining kinship in regard to the Korowai people of Western New Guinea as "inter-subjective belonging," Rupert Stasch (2009, 107, 129ff.) provides a superb ethnography of the argument I make here. People's possessive prefixing of kinship terms, Stasch writes, "emphasizes that a kinship other is a predicate of oneself. A speaker recognizes the other as the speaker's own, and embraces that other as an object proper to the speaker's own being" (132). In some respect, his discussion is even useful for a certain ambiguity, in that he rather stresses "belonging" in the differentiating sense of "possession," thus implying a self/other relation, while noting also the alternate sense of "being a part of," thus of mutual co-presence (132).[11] However, when discussing the subjectivity of kin relationships, the emotional and moral solidarity, there is no doubt he is speaking of "mutuality of being" in the latter meaning, for he uses that very phrase:

> Reckoning with ways that emotion, value, and morality are integral to kin categorization, anthropologists have often previously linked kin relationships to feelings of intersubjective mutuality of being, using such terms as "conviviality," "love," "care," "amity," and "enduring, diffuse solidarity." . . . These vocabularies are all pertinent to understanding Korowai kin relatedness. Korowai themselves frequently describe specific kin relations in terms of a feeling of "love, longing, care" (*finop*) for a person, a mental activity of "caring for,

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11. The self/other opposition is reiterated in Stasch's adoption of Faubion's observation that "the terms of kinship are inherently linking terms; . . . they render the self in and through its relation to certain others (and vice versa)" (Faubion 2001, 3; quoted in Stasch 2009, 132). In the work referred to, Faubion treats kinship as a technology of the self in the Foucauldian sense: a technology of "subjectivation" consisting in part of "subjection" (or Althusserian "interpellation") and in part of self-fashioning (2001, 11ff.).

loving" (*xul duo-*; lit., "thinking about") another person, or a moral
position of being "unitary, solidary, amicable" (*lelip*; lit., "together")
with someone. (133)

Stasch here refers to a number of well-known observations on
kinship amity, including those of Schneider (1968, 1984), Meyer
Fortes (1969), and Robert McKinley (2001). Just as well known
are the reservations almost all anthropologists quickly append,
so soon as they speak of kinship love, to the effect that in prac-
tice not all kin are lovable—and often the closest relatives have
the worst quarrels (see below). In Stasch's own terms: "Kinship
belonging is an impossible standard: the ideal includes its own
failure" (2009, 136). No gainsaying that, but that does not gainsay
either the amity subsumed in kinship relations of interdepen-
dent existence. I take diffuse enduring solidarity and the like as
the corollary subjectivity of mutual being. Aloha is even implied,
although of course love is not a relation of kinship alone and no
matter that it is honored in the breach. A breach of kinship love
also implies the constituted love of kinfolk: the failure includes
its own ideal.

12. Alan Rumsey (personal communication) points out that, according to this
characterization, Melanesian persons are as individually as they are dividually con-
ceived—which poses something of an unexamined problem. Probably Strathern meant
a dividual person as an individual entity (or subject).