

PROCESSO SELETIVO 2017-2018

PROVA DE LÍNGUA ESTRANGEIRA – INGLÊS

Instruções:

1. Na página seguinte, você encontrará cinco questões, que devem ser respondidas tendo como base o texto em inglês que acompanha a prova.
2. As questões deverão ser respondidas em um **arquivo Word** no qual deve constar, na primeira linha, seu nome completo. Todas as questões são obrigatórias.
3. Só é permitido o uso de **dicionários** trazidos pelos próprios candidatos. Não será aceito nenhum outro material de consulta.
4. Você terá **quatro horas** para concluir a prova, que deve ser respondida **em português**.
5. Cada resposta deverá ser identificada com o **número da questão**.
6. Procure ater-se ao texto para elaborar suas respostas.
7. Ao responder as questões, **não forneça uma tradução do texto original**. Lembre-se que o objetivo desta prova é avaliar sua capacidade de leitura e compreensão de textos em língua estrangeira.
8. Ao concluir a prova, certifique-se de que a identificou com seu nome e peça ao responsável pela aplicação do exame que **salve seu arquivo pdf em um pendrive**.

Texto: Edward M. Bruner, trecho de *Ethnography as narrative*, sexto capítulo de Turner, Victor W. e Bruner, Edward M. (orgs.) *The anthropology of experience*. University of Illinois Press: Urbana e Chicago, 1986, pp. 139-145.

QUESTÕES

1. Qual é, nas palavras do autor, seu objetivo e sua principal tese no texto?
2. Quais são as duas narrativas dominantes na antropologia identificadas pelo autor, para desenvolver sua tese no texto?
3. Qual a relação identificada pelo autor entre tais narrativas e papéis sociais? Elabore com base na reflexão por ele desenvolvida sobre as duas narrativas dominantes na antropologia.
4. Explique qual o contraste estabelecido pelo autor entre a tese central desse texto e a posição que este identifica na obra de Lévi-Strauss?
5. De acordo com a tese apresentada por Bruner, quais as implicações de pensar a etnografia como uma narrativa com passado, presente e futuro para o fazer antropológico?

- Tedlock, Dennis. 1971. "On the Translation of Style in Oral Narrative," *Journal of American Folklore* 84:114-33.
- Valdes, Mario, and Owen J. Miller. 1978. *Interpretation of Narrative*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- White, Hayden. 1980. "The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality," *Critical Inquiry* 7(1):5-27.

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Ethnography as Narrative

EDWARD M. BRUNER

... of all learned discourse, the ethnological seems to come closest to a Fiction.

Roland Barthes

My aim here is to take a reflexive view of the production of ethnography; my thesis is that ethnographies are guided by an implicit narrative structure, by a story we tell about the peoples we study. We are familiar with the stories people tell about themselves in life history and psychiatric interviews, in myth and ritual, in history books and Balinese cockfights. I wish to extend this notion to ethnography as discourse, as a genre of storytelling.¹ To develop this position I take as an example ethnological studies of Native American culture change. It is an area in which I have had direct field experience and for which the facts are widely known; also, the subject has occupied a prominent place in the history of American anthropology.

In the 1930s and 1940s the dominant story constructed about Native American culture change saw the present as disorganization, the past as glorious, and the future as assimilation. Now, however, we have a new narrative: the present is viewed as a resistance movement, the past as exploitation, and the future as ethnic resurgence. What is so striking is that the transition from one narrative structure to another occurred rapidly, within a decade after World War II. Equally striking is that there is so little historical continuity between the two dominant stories: one story simply became discredited and the new narrative took over. The theoretic-

cal concepts associated with the outmoded story, such as acculturation and assimilation, are used less frequently and another set of terms has become prominent: exploitation, oppression, colonialism, resistance, liberation, independence, nationalism, tribalism, identity, tradition, and ethnicity—the code words of the 1970s.

The transition from a story of acculturation to one of ethnic resurgence is not merely characterized by a change in theoretical concepts on the level of vocabulary—there has also been a shift in the way the ethnography is constructed, on the level of syntax. In the old story the golden age was in the past and the descriptive problem was to reconstruct the old Indian culture, to create a beginning (Said 1975). The end of the narrative, the disappearance of Indian culture, was not problematic—it was assumed—and the middle, the present-day scene, was interpreted in terms of this sense of an ending (Kermode 1967) as progressive breakdown, pathology, and disintegration. In the 1970s story, however, the golden age is in the future, as the indigenous people struggle against exploitation and oppression to preserve their ethnic identity. The ethnographic problematic is now one of documenting resistance and telling how tradition and ethnicity are maintained; or if they are seriously threatened, the anthropologist may even make a political decision to intervene on behalf of the people, or possibly to take steps to help prevent cultural extinction or genocide. In the early development of American anthropology there was definite concern with cultural extinction, but as it was assumed to be inevitable, the aim was to describe Indian cultures before they disappeared, not to facilitate their continuity. In this sense narrative structures provide social roles for the anthropologist as well as for the Indian people. Regarding the latter, from my own experience in 1948 among the Navajo, and starting in 1951 among the Mandan-Hidatsa of the Fort Berthold Reservation, I can testify that we met many Indian informants, particularly older men, who were eager to provide information about the glorious past, whereas now we meet many Indian activists fighting for a better future. In the 1930s narrative it was the past that pervaded the present; in the 1970s narrative it is the future.

Stories make meaning. They operate at the level of semantics in addition to vocabulary and syntax (White 1980; Turner 1980). Just as a story has a beginning, a middle, and an end, culture change, too, almost by definition, takes the form of a sequence

with a past, a present, and a future. Our predicament in ethnographic studies of change is that all we have before us is the present, the contemporary scene, and by one means or another we must situate that present in a time sequence. It would be naive to believe that we anthropologists simply describe the present but reconstruct the past and construct the future, even though we use language that suggests this—for example, when we talk of gathering or collecting the data as if it were like ripe fruit waiting to be picked, or when we talk of our special anthropological methodologies for reconstructing the past, as if the present were not equally constructed. The past, present, and future are not only constructed but connected in a lineal sequence that is defined by systematic if not casual relations. How we depict any one segment of the sequence is related to our conception of the whole, which I choose to think of as a story.

My position may become clearer when contrasted with that of Lévi-Strauss. He writes that “all myths tell a story” (1966:26), but “instead of reducing the story or myth to a mere narrative [he urges us] to try to discover the scheme of discontinuous oppositions governing its organization” (1966:136). The power of his method of analyzing paradigmatic structures has been amply documented, but we may do equally well to try to discover the syntagmatic structure beyond the surface narrative. Such structures cannot be reduced to metonymy precisely because they are more than relations of contiguity—they are systematically ordered, and therein lies their meaning. If classificatory schemes provide a science of the concrete, narrative schemes may provide a science of the imagination. At the very least, a reemphasis on temporality may enable us to deal more directly with change, and thereby to make structural and symbolic studies more dynamic.²

Let me illustrate the semantic dimension with the 1930s narrative. Given the master story of a once proud people whose spirit had been broken and who would soon become assimilated into what was then called the “mainstream of American life,” all tribes could be located—the acculturated Sioux in one chapter, the more traditional Hopi in an earlier chapter, and the Indians of the East Coast, who were thought to be virtually extinct, in the last chapter. Ethnographers were able to interpret their field experience in terms of how their particular reservation situation fitted into the lineal sequence of the dominant story of the era.

As editor of a volume of seven case studies prepared in the late 1930s, Linton (1940:462) wrote of the San Ildefonso: "Although the old ceremonies are still going on with full apparent vigor . . . it seems probable that the next few years will see a collapse of the esoteric aspects of the culture and a rapid acculturation of the society." And ". . . Ute culture steadily approaches its final resolution in complete assimilation" (1940:201). Of the White Knife Shoshoni he wrote: "There seem to be no internal factors which would prevent their complete Europeanization" (1940:118). "Lastly, everything indicates that the ultimate end of situations of close and continuous first hand contact is the amalgamation of the societies and cultures involved, although this conclusion may be postponed almost indefinitely . . ." (1940:519). We are told that amalgamation is inevitable but that it may be postponed indefinitely—a neat trick. What is so remarkable is that in not one of the seven cases discussed had complete assimilation occurred, but such a distinguished anthropologist as Ralph Linton assumed that it would, despite evidence to the contrary in the very case studies he was analyzing. Such is the power of a story once it has captured the imagination.

Given this 1930s vision of the future and the convention of reconstructing the "aboriginal" past as an integrated culture, the present could only be interpreted as disintegration, framed as it was by both glorious integrity and eventual disappearance. My aim here is not to review a literature with which we are all familiar, but rather to emphasize that the present is given meaning in terms of that anticipated present we call the future and that former present we call the past (Culler 1979:162). Stories are interpretive devices which give meaning to the present in terms of location in an ordered syntagmatic sequence—the exact opposite of anthropological common sense. As anthropologists, we usually think that we first investigate the present, more or less scientifically, and thereafter reconstruct the past and anticipate the future. In my view, we begin with a narrative that already contains a beginning and an ending, which frame and hence enable us to interpret the present. It is not that we initially have a body of data, the facts, and we then must construct a story or a theory to account for them. Instead, to paraphrase Schafer (1980:30), the narrative structures we construct are not secondary narratives about data but primary narratives that establish what is to count

as data. New narratives yield new vocabulary, syntax, and meaning in our ethnographic accounts; they define what constitute the data of those accounts.

My claim is that one story—past glory, present disorganization, future assimilation—was dominant in the 1930s and a second story—past oppression, present resistance, future resurgence—in the 1970s, but in both cases I refer to dominance in the anthropological literature, in ethnographic discourse, not necessarily in Indian experience. My focus is on our talk about Indians, not on Indian life itself. Our anthropological stories about Indians are representations, not to be confused with concrete existence or "real" facts. In other words, life experience is richer than discourse.

Narrative structures organize and give meaning to experience, but there are always feelings and lived experience not fully encompassed by the dominant story. Only after the new narrative becomes dominant is there a reexamination of the past, a rediscovery of old texts, and a recreation of the new heroes of liberation and resistance. The new story articulates what had been only dimly perceived, authenticates previous feelings, legitimizes new actions, and aligns individual consciousness with a larger social movement. What had previously been personal becomes historical; a "model of" is transformed into a "model for" (Geertz 1973). From the perspective of the present we construct a continuous story, stressing the continuity of resistance, whereas actually there was a marked discontinuity from the diminution of one narrative to the rise of another. Foucault's (1973) notion of strata is relevant here, but more as an archaeology of discourse than an archaeology of epistemological fields. Certainly, there was active Indian resistance in the past, probably more so in expressive culture than in direct political action, in the form of jokes (Basso 1979), and in such religious movements as the Ghost Dance, the Sun Dance, and the Native American Church. Retrospectively, we see that there always were expressions of resistance in Indian experience, and there were early formulations of the story of resistance. Nevertheless, we can pinpoint the time when the new narrative became dominant in discourse—with the formation in 1961 of the National Indian Youth Council and the American Indian Chicago Conference (Lurie 1961), with the publication of the *Indian Historian* in 1964, with the establishment of AIM in 1968, with the publication of Vine Deloria's *Custer Died for Your Sins* in 1969, and with the

anthropological writings of Clemmer (1970), Jorgensen (1972), and others.

I am reasonably confident in my identification of the two narrative structures and in the prominence of one in the discourse of the 1930s and of the other in the 1970s. A possible explanation of the two narratives is that the Indian story *is* resistance and the white story *is* assimilation—that the two are just the different points of view of the oppressed and the oppressor. I reject this explanation because it is, in effect, only another telling of the resistance story and because I do not believe it is historically accurate. The resistance story was not dominant in Indian discourse until after World War II, and by the early 1950s American anthropologists (e.g., Vogt 1957; Province 1954) were questioning Indian assimilation, the myth of the melting pot. Further, both Indian and anthropologist share the same narrative—not that one narrative is Indian and the other white—a fact that subsequently will be made evident.

Another view is offered by Jorgensen (1972:ix) who wrote that the acculturation story is “nonsense” and the resistance story is “truth,” so that in effect the movement from one story to the other is seen as an advance in scientific understanding. Jorgensen was simply privileging one of the two stories, but I understand the reasons for his conviction. I have published on the side of ethnicity and against the acculturation-urbanization framework in a series of papers dating back to 1953 (e.g., Bruner 1953, 1961, 1974). I also realize that stories are not ideologically neutral.

Narratives are not only structures of meaning but structures of power as well. The assimilation story has been a mask for oppression; the resistance story is a justification for claims of redress for past exploitation. Both carry policy and political implications. The reasoning in the assimilation narrative is that if Indians are going to disappear anyway, then their land can be leased or sold to whites; in the ethnic resurgence narrative we are told that if Indians are here to stay, tribal resources must be built up. Assimilation is a program for redemption; resistance, for self- and ethnic fulfillment. The terms themselves—acculturation, resistance, neocolonialism—are pregnant with meaning. Each narrative uses different images, language, and style. The Indian in the acculturation narrative is romantic, the exotic Other; the resistance Indian is victimized. Stories construct an Indian self; narrative structures are constitutive as well as interpretive.

The two narratives, in my view, are dual aspects of the same phenomenon; one is a counterpoint to the other. There may even be cycles of narratives, for each contains a basic contradiction. The assimilation story leads to outside pressures for change, which thereby generate resistance. The resistance story, in time, will lead to greater security in the people's own culture and identity, making it easier to change more rapidly and thereby facilitate assimilation. In any case, there also was resistance in the 1930s and acculturation in the 1970s, for the dual processes of change and persistence, of acculturation and nationalism, have occurred simultaneously throughout Indian history. My only claim is that different narratives are foregrounded in the discourse of different historical eras.

The key elements in narrative are story, discourse, and telling. The *story* is the abstract sequence of events, systematically related, the syntagmatic structure. *Discourse* is the text in which the story is manifested, the statement in a particular medium such as a novel, myth, lecture, film, conversation, or whatever. *Telling* is the action, the act of narrating, the communicative process that produces the story in discourse. No distinction is made here between telling and showing, as the same story may be recounted or enacted or both.³

We may ask whether the “same” story is told in different versions, as Chatman (1978) assumes. If a story is conceived of as an “invariant core” (Culler 1980:28), independent of its presentation, then it becomes a kind of “Platonic ideal form . . . that occupies a highly privileged ontological realm of pure Being within which it unfolds immutably and eternally” (Herrnstein-Smith 1980:216). The issue is a familiar one to anthropologists. In explaining the distinction between model and behavior, for example, Leach (1976:5) uses a musical analogy: although we may hear an incompetent performance of a Beethoven symphony, we must remember that the real symphony exists as a musical score, as a model, and not in any particular manifestation. My friends in musicology tell me that Leach might well have selected Mahler instead of Beethoven, as Mahler's scores are exceedingly detailed and precise whereas Beethoven's scripts are loosely written and hence subject to more varied interpretation. In any case, Leach's perspective is theoretically paralyzing, as he has no way to take account of experience and no way to discriminate between a flawed performance and structural change. For Leach, every item