



UNIVERSIDADE ESTADUAL DE CAMPINAS
DIRETORIA ACADÊMICA

PROGRAMAS E BIBLIOGRAFIAS

2º período letivo de 2019

Disciplina: código e nome

Tópicos Especiais de Metafísica I (HG531 A)

Docente:

Pedro Merlussi

Ementa:

This is an advanced course where we will have a look at some of the highlights in the contemporary free will literature. Our focus will be on the metaphysical problem of free will: Is the existence of human freedom compatible with our universe being deterministic? This is the subject of prolific and intense discussion in the contemporary literature. Even though our main focus is on the metaphysical problem, we will deal with different approaches, including epistemological considerations involving epistemic conservatism as well as axiological considerations involving moral faith. Our goal is to chart discussions and discover new avenues for progress. Moreover, you should be able to practice and develop the ability to do philosophy, in writing and in public.

Programa:

- 1) We kick off with optimism, the view according to which we have prima facie justification for thinking that there is free will. We will discuss an argument for optimism from a Redidian (“common sense”) epistemological outlook. In particular, we will read Huemer’s argument for epistemic conservatism, and how that might be used to motivate optimism.
- 2) Incompatibilism. Do we have good prima facie reason to believe that, if determinism is true, then no one has free will? Here, we will discuss the direct arguments and the manipulation arguments.
- 3) Understanding and comparing Event-Causalism and Agent-Causalism. We will discuss Kane’s influential view and O’Connor’s defence of Agent-Causalism.
- 4) Axiological considerations. Should our view about human free will be determined solely by considerations of evidence (understood narrowly in terms of that which raises the likelihood that a proposition is true)?



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Bibliografia:

- 1) Foley, R. (1983). "Epistemic Conservatism", *Philosophical Studies*, 43(2): 165-182.
Huemer, M. (2007). "Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 74(1): 30-55.
Huemer, M. (2001). *Skepticism and the Veil of Perception*, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- 2) McKenna, M., & Pereboom, D. (2016). *Free Will: A Contemporary Introduction*. New York: Routledge. Introduction and chapters 1, 2, and 4.
- 3) Kane, R. (2007). *Libertarianism*. In Fischer, J. M., Kane, R., Pereboom, D., & Vargas, M. (Eds.), *Four Views on Free Will* (pp. 5-43). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. O'Connor, T. (2011). *Libertarian Views: Dualist and Agent Causal Theories*. In Kane, R. (Ed.), *Oxford Handbook On Free Will, 2nd ed.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- 4) Deery, O., Bedke, M., & Nichols, S. (2013). *Phenomenal Abilities: Incompatibilism and the Experience of Agency*. In Shoemaker, D. (Ed.), *Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Vol. 1* (pp.126-50). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Speak, D (2004). *Toward an Axiological Defense of Libertarianism*. *Philosophical Topics*, 32, 353-269.
Adams, R. (1995). *Moral Faith*. *The Journal of Philosophy*, 92(2), 75-95.
Pereboom, D. (2014). *Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapters 2 and 3.

Observações:

Requirements: Either i) two short (10–15 page) papers, or ii) one term paper (20–30 pages). Please clear paper topics with me. I'll suggest some topics in class. Office hours: Mondays 14:40–16:35.