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**HF946-I – SEMINÁRIO DE ORIENTAÇÃO EM HISTÓRIA DA FILOSOFIA CONTEMPORÂNEA II**

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**PROF. MARCO ANTONIO CARON RUFFINO****PROF. EMILIANO BOCCARDI****1º SEMESTRE/2015****EMENTA:****PART I: COURSE AIMS AND OBJECTIVES**

Conceptions of time have always played a fundamental role in our philosophical and scientific understanding of the world and of ourselves. They have become especially important in the XX century, and even more during the past few decades. The primary goal of this course is to introduce and discuss most contemporary philosophical views about time and a number of related philosophical problems. What is the present? How does it differ from the past and the future? If things really change, must we think that facts change too? Is the passage of time real or, like Einstein thought, is it but a “persistent illusion”? What does it take for an object to persist through time while remaining identical to itself? Finally, we shall discuss the philosophical import of contemporary physics as to the nature of time. In particular, we shall discuss whether accepting Einstein’s theory of relativity forces us to radically change our philosophical intuitions about the nature of time and passage (a brief introduction to the theory will be provided. No previous knowledge of advanced mathematics or physics is required). The course will be articulated in two weakly sessions. The first two-hour session will consist of lectures introducing the relevant topics; the second will be devoted to the relevant literature and to its critical evaluation.

**PART II: READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF TIME**

This part of the course is devoted to the critical discussion of a number of readings relevant to the topics introduced during the lectures. It also aims at clarifying, through examples and exercises, the technical concepts needed to understand some of the material. Students will be asked to read the papers in advance, and to briefly present (in turn) the readings. The goals of this part of the course are the following:

1. Acquire sufficient familiarity with relevant texts in the Philosophy of Time.
2. Acquire and master the most basic technical notions needed to understand the reading material.
3. Participate in class discussions concerning the issues treated during the lectures and those that emerge in the assigned readings.
4. Demonstrate comprehension of key concepts, tenets, and arguments from assigned readings, with awareness of the complexity and nuance within the views expressed in those readings.
5. Recognize and discuss connections between assigned reading material and issues relevant to our lives.

**LECTURE CONTENTS AND READINGS:**

Week 1 - Introduction: Time as Series and as Flow

Essential readings:

• Donald Williams, 1951, *The Myth of Passage*, *Journal of Philosophy*, 48: 457–472.

• Tooley, 1997, *Time, Tense, and Causation*, Oxford: Oxford University Press (introduction). Recommended readings: • Smart, J.J.C., 1955, *Spatialising Time*, *Mind*, 64: 239–241. • —, 1949, *The River of Time*, *Mind*, 58: 483–494; reprinted in Antony Flew (ed.), *Essays in Conceptual Analysis*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966, pp. 213–227).

Week 2 - McTaggart's argument for the unreality of time: part I Essential readings:

• J. M. E. McTaggart, 'The Unreality of Time', taken from Chapter 33 of *The Nature of Existence* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1921), and also reprinted in Le Poidevin and MacBeath, (edd.), pp. 23–34. See also original version published as 'The Unreality of Time', *Mind*, 17, 1908: 457–74

Recommended readings:

• Michael Dummett, 'A Defence of McTaggart's Proof of the Unreality of Time', *Philosophical Review*, 69, 1960: 497–504.

Week 3 - McTaggart's argument for the unreality of time: part II

Essential readings:

• Kit Fine, *Tense and Reality* in Kit Fine (ed.), *Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 261–320

Recommended readings:

• Robin LePoidevin, 2002, *Zeno's Arrow and the Significance of the Present*, in Craig Callender (ed.), *Time, Reality and Experience*, Cambridge University Press

Week 4 - Tense and tenseless theories of time: part I

Essential readings:

• D. H. Mellor, 'The Unreality of Tense', originally in *Real Time*, Cambridge, CUP, 1981, reprinted in Le Poidevin & MacBeath, pp. 47–59.

• Oaklander, L. Nathan & Smith, Quentin (eds.) (1994). *The New Theory of Time*. Yale Up. Recommended readings:

• Craig Bourne, 'When Am I?: A Tense Time for Some Tense Theorists?' *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 80, 2002: 359–71.

Week 4 - Tense and tenseless theories of time: part II

Essential readings:

• Dean Zimmerman, 2005, *The A-theory of Time, the B-theory of Time, and 'Taking Tense Seriously'*, *Dialectica*, 59: 401–457. Recommended readings:

• J. J. C. Smart, 'Spatialising Time', *Mind*, 64, 1955: 239–41 Recommended readings:

• Le Poidevin, Robin (ed.), 1998, *Questions of Time and Tense*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Week 5 - Three-Dimensionalism vs. Four-Dimensionalism (Endurantism vs. Perdurantism): part I

Essential readings: • Sally Haslanger, "Persistence Through Time"

Recommended readings: • David Lewis, 1986, *On the Plurality of Worlds*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.



Week 6 - Three-Dimensionalism vs. Four-Dimensionalism (Endurantism vs. Perdurantism):  
part II

Essential readings:

- Theodore Sider, 2001, *Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time*, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Recommended readings:

- Michael C. Rea (2003). Four-dimensionalism. In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics*. Oxford University Press. 1-59.

- Theodore Sider (2000). The Stage View and Temporary Intrinsics. *Analysis* 60 (1):84 - 88.

Week 7 - Presentism: part I

Essential readings:

- €Arthur Prior, 1967, *Past, Present, and Future*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. —, 1968a, “Changes in Events and Changes in Things,” in Arthur Prior, *Papers on Time and Tense*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1–14.

- €Theodor Sider, 1999, Presentism and Ontological Commitment, *Journal of Philosophy*, 96: 325–347. Recommended readings:

- Arthur Prior, 1968b, *Papers on Time and Tense*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- , 1970, “The Notion of the Present,” *Stadium Generale*, 23: 245–248.

Week 8 - Presentism: part II

Essential readings:

- €Ned Markosian, 2003, “A Defense of Presentism,” in Dean Zimmerman (ed.), *Oxford Studies in Metaphysics (Volume 1)*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- €Arthur Prior, 1976, “Thank Goodness That's Over,” in Arthur N. Prior, *Papers in Logic and Ethics*, London: Duckworth, pp. 78–84. Recommended readings:

- L. Nathan Oaklander (2010). McTaggart's paradox and Crisp's presentism. *Philosophia* 38 (2):229-241.

Week 9 - The block universe

Essential readings:

- €L. Nathan Oaklander (1993). On the Experience of Tenseless Time. *Journal of Philosophical Research* 18:159-166.

- €Steven Frederick Savitt (ed.) (1995). *Time's Arrows Today: Recent Physical and Philosophical Work on the Direction of Time*. Cambridge University Press.

Recommended readings:

- Bertrand Russell (1903). *Principles of Mathematics*. Routledge.

Week 10 - Recapitulation: does time pass?

Essential readings:

- €Simon Prosser (2013). The Passage of Time. In Adrian Bardon Heather Dyke (ed.), *A Companion to the Philosophy of Time*. Wiley-Blackwell. 315-327.

- €G. Schlesinger (1969). The two notions of the passage of time. *Noûs* 3 (1):1-16.

- €John Bigelow, *The Passage of Time*. Recommended readings:

- Heather Dyke (2002). Mc Taggart and the Truth about Time. In Craig Callender (ed.), *Time, Reality and Experience*. Cambridge University Press. 137-.