



**CP058-G – TÓPICOS ESPECIAIS EM ESTADO, PROCESSOS POLÍTICOS
E ORGANIZAÇÃO DE INTERESSES I**

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Richard Fenno em uma conferência afirmou que é no Legislativo que a democracia acontece. Na medida em que é no Legislativo que os interesses mais diversos se cruzam e eventualmente se chocam. E é através desse processo que as decisões são tomadas, decisões que afetam a vida de todos. Mas o que determina o comportamento dos legisladores? Instituições certamente importam, mas como e quando e em que medida é que instituições moldam o comportamento dos legisladores?

Essa matéria pretende oferecer um panorama sobre a área de Estudos Legislativos, dando ênfase para trabalhos que procuram conectar arena legislativa e arena eleitoral e tiveram grande impacto no campo no debate internacional e nacional sobre estudos legislativos. Serão abordados 4 grandes temas, a saber: os modelos de ação parlamentar, teorias distributivistas, informacional e partidária; o papel da centralização institucional no comportamento dos legisladores (segredo eficiente); a controvérsia sobre o papel dos partidos políticos na condução dos trabalhos legislativos; e a formação de coalizões.

1. Apresentação do curso

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3. Modelos de ação: distributivistas, informacional e partidário

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5. A controvérsia sobre os partidos

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